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Recent Decisions
HOSPITALS - MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONS - CONFLICT BETWEEN DIRECTOR'S INSPECTION RIGHT AND
PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp.,

15 N.Y.2d 317, 206 N.E.2d 338, 258 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1965).
In almost every medical research problem, a time comes when
laboratory experiments and observations must be confirmed in human subjects. The step from the use of laboratory animals to human beings is cluttered with moral uncertainties, forcing the clinical investigator to balance the ultimate benefit to society against the
risk to a few. Unfortunately, the law is of little help to the research
physician. Although doctors are aware of such legal concepts as
negligence, consent, malpractice, and assault, these familiar doctrines skirt crucial moral issues and are more useful in guiding the
practicing physician than the clinical investigator. The doctrine
which holds the doctor to the standard of practice in his community
is difficult to reconcile with the need to develop new techniques and
remedies. Can a clinical investigator be charged with negligence
when his experiment is carefully conceived, scientifically accurate,
and meticulously performed? What constitutes intelligent consent
to a proposed experiment? Where can the doctor find guidance
outside of his own profession?
A partial answer to these questions is contained in Hyman v.
Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp.1 in which the New York Court of
Appeals granted leave to a member of that hospital's board of directors to examine the hospital records of certain patients to determine the alleged impropriety of experiments performed on them.
The controversy in Hyman began when doctors of the Sloan-Kettering Institute supervised and directed the injection of living cancer cells
into certain patients of the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital.? Previously, in experiments supported by the United States Public Health
Service and the American Cancer Society, doctors had injected live
cancer cells into healthy volunteers at the Ohio State Penitentiary.3
115 N.Y.2d 317, 206 N.E.2d 338, 258 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1965).
2 Langer, Human Experimentation: Cancer Studies at Sloan-Kettering Stir Public
Debate on Medical Ethics, 143 ScIENcE 551 (1964).
3ibid.
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They learned from these trials that healthy individuals rejected cancer cells within six to eight weeks. In contrast, rejection was much
slower in cancer patients who also received the injections.4 Doctors could not decide if the slow rejection of the cells in cancer patients was due to their illness or to their weakened condition.' Believing this determination to be critical to an understanding of the
disease, 6 they injected live cancer cells into twenty-two non-cancerous but debilitated patients at the defendant hospital.7
The hospital and doctors involved in the experiment allegedly
obtained oral permission from the patients before the injection but
"the patients were not told that the injection was of cancer cells because the doctors did not wish to stir up any unnecessary anxieties
in the patients."8 The doctors felt there was no need to elaborate
because they believed no risk was involved.'
The subject litigation evolved from the question of whether the
patients were truly aware of the nature of the injections to which
they were subjected."0 Hyman, the petitioner, a lay member of the
hospital's board of directors, upon learning of the experiment from
staff doctors who had resigned in protest, alleged that the patients
did not comprehend the true nature of the procedure and were
therefore incompetent to give their consent." When hospital officials refused the petitioner access to the patients' medical records,
citing the physician-patient privilege statute, 2 Hyman petitioned the

4 Id. at 552.
5 ibid.
6
Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 21 App. Div. 2d 495, 251 N.Y.S.2d
818 (1964), rev'd, 15 N.Y.2d 317, 206 N.E.2d 338, 258 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1965).
In
stating the facts of the case, the appellate division stated:
The experiments showed that the sick and debilitated non-cancer patients
had the same response to foreign cancer cells as healthy volunteers, that is,
there was a prompt rejection of the transplant. This in turn opened a wide
possibility that, if there be such a biological mechanism as a defense against
cancer, it may be possible to stimulate it either before cancer strikes or perhaps even later when the cancer has taken hold. Id. at 497, 251 N.Y.S.2d
at 820.
7 Langer, supra note 2, at 552.
8 Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 21 App. Div. 2d 495, 497, 251 N.Y.S.2d
818, 819 (1964), rev'd, 15 N.Y.2d 317, 206 N.E.2d 338, 258 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1965).
9 Langer, supra note 2, at 552.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid. "The 22 patients.. . were between 43 and 83 years old. All were sick....
Some of the patients were not even capable of giving consent: several were senile, some
spoke only Yiddish, and one was deaf." Ibid.
12 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 4 504 (a).
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New York Supreme Court for the right as a corporate director to
examine the pertinent hospital records and charts."3 The trial court
refused to decide the issue of the impropriety of the experiments
which the director raised, but supported his absolute right to inspect corporate records 4 and said that the medical records must be
accessible to him. 5
On appeal, the appellate division denied the inspection order
on the ground that it violated the physician-patient privilege, discounted petitioner's fear of personal liability for improper management and added that since written consent to experimental procedures was now required at defendant hospital as a consequence of
the dispute, the director's need to inspect the records was moot. 6
Rejecting the appellate division's insistence upon the supremacy
of the physician-patient privilege, 7 the New York Court of Appeals held that the director of a hospital corporation was entitled
as a matter of law to inspect hospital records in the performance of
his stewardship and that the secrecy imposed upon hospital and medical records, in the absence of a waiver by the patient, did not extend
to qualified persons such as a hospital director.' 8 The privacy of the
patient could be protected, as the trial court had pointed out, by a
simple order requiring that the patient's name be concealed.'" To
the hospital's argument that, in the absence of his own bad faith,

13 Under the provisions of N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. § 1801.
14Application of Hyman, 42 Misc. 2d 427, 248 N.Y.S.2d 245 (Sup. Ct. 1964),
af'd sub nom., Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 317, 206 N.E.2d
338, 258 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1965).
15 Quoting HAYr & GRoESCHEL, LAW OF HosPrrAL, PuYsiCIAN AND PATiENT
(2d ed. 1952), a well-known text written by a lawyer who filed an amicus curiae brief
for the defendant hospital when the case went up on appeal. Hyman v. Jewish Chronic
Disease Hosp., 21 App. Div. 2d 495, 251 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1964), rev'd, 15 N.Y.2d 317,
206 N.E.2d 338, 258 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1965). The trial court said that although the
medical record was the hospital's property, it must be accessible to all those with a legitimate interest in it. Ruling that Hyman, as a corporate director, was one with, legitimate
interest, the trial court noted that the physician-patient privilege would not be violated
because the information sought would not be disclosed to outsiders or to a formal investigating committee. Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 42 Misc. 2d 427, 248
N.Y.S.2d 245, (Sup. Ct. 1964), af'd, 15 N.Y.2d 317, 206 N.Y.2d 338, 258 N.Y.S.2d

397 (1965).
16Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 21 App. Div. 2d 495, 257 N.Y.S.2d
818 (1964), -reed,15 N.Y.2d 317, 206 N.E.2d 338, 258 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1965).
178 WIGMORE, EvmiDNc § 2380a (McNaughton rev. 1961); 54 HARv. L. REv.
705-06 (1961); 26 CORNELL LQ. 482 (1941).
18Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 317, 206 N.E.2d 338, 258
N.Y.S.2d 397 (1965).
19 Ibid.
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the corporate director was not personally liable for any impropriety
in the management of the corporation," the court countered that
the possibility of the corporation's liability entitled the director to
examine the situation and that he could act for himself in carrying
out his duties without authorization from the patients whom he did
not claim to represent.2 '
The subject case brings into conflict two well-established principles of law - the corporate director's inspection right and the
physician-patient privilege. An examination of the pertinent legal
literature fails to disclose another case in which the physicianpatient privilege has been held to be secondary to the rights of a
corporate director. Certainly, as the court pointed out, the inspection
right of a corporate director is firmly established in New York and
other jurisdictions.'
Even as a common law principle, a director's
right of inspection is absolute.2 4
Modern courts require "directors and officers

. . .

to act care-

fully in the light of their actual knowledge and such knowledge as
they should have gained by reasonable care and skill."25 Presumably, one of the director's sources of knowledge comes by inspecting
corporate records. In addition, many statutes delineate the duty of
due care owed by directors to their corporation.2" Whether inspection of hospital records falls within the ambit of "due care," as
it has been defined in various statutes, is not clear.2
20

Hinkle Iron Co. v. Kohn, 229 N.Y. 179, 128 N.E. 113 (1920).
Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 317, 206 N.E.2d 338, 258
N.Y.S.2d 397 (1965).
The dissent maintained that even though the experiment was
not conducted for diagnosis and treatment of the patients' illnesses, the recorded results
came within the physician-patient privilege, and in the absence of waiver by the patients,
petitioner was not entitled to inspect the records, a privilege established in New York
City Council v. Goldwater, 284 N.Y. 296, 31 N.E.2d 31 (1940). Accord, Munzer v.
State, 41 N.Y.S.2d 98 (Cr. Cl. 1943); Munzer v. Blaisdell, 183 Misc. 773, 49 N.Y.S.2d
915, aH'd, 269 App. Div. 970, 58 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1944).
22 Because a corporate director's positive duty of due care subjects him to potential
liability for corporate mismanagement, the courts of New York have given him an unqualified right to inspect corporate records to be fully informed of the affairs of the
corporation. E.g., Cohen v. Cocoline Prods., Inc., 309 N.Y. 119, 127 N.E.2d 906
(1955). The privilege was extended to directors of a membership corporation in Martin v. Martin Foundation, Inc., 32 Misc. 2d 873, 224 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Sup. Ct. 1962);
Davids v. Sillcox, 297 N.Y. 355, 79 N.E.2d 440 (1948). This right was said to have
originated in the common law. People ex rel. Muir v. Throop, 12 Wend. 183 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1834).
23
HENN, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusINEss ENTERPRISES 346 (1961).
21

24

Ibid.

25 Id. at 367.
26 Id. at 366.
27 Ibid.
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The legal protection of medical records as an evidentiary rule
is firmly established. 28 Although at common law a physician could
not refuse to divulge information about his patient, 9 the communication of medical confidences has been specifically protected by statute
in most jurisdictions." While courts in some jurisdictions have construed these statutes strictly, as abrogations of the common law, and
have confined them to testimony in a court of record,3 the majority
have interpreted the statutes more liberally." The classic example
of the latter view is New York City Council v. Goldwater." There,
the court refused to order the release of hospital records to a legislative committee of the municipal government investigating charges
of negligence and malpractice in municipal hospitals, holding that
the physician-patient privilege would not be limited to civil proceedings alone. This philosophy has been followed in New York, 4
and only in rare instances have the New York courts allowed any
latitude as a matter of public policy 5
Despite overtones of corporate law and evidentiary rules, there
remain, in Hyman, undertones of the moral dilemma about which the
court refused to speak directly. The underlying issue is the extent
to which the laity can and should control human experimentation. 6
288 WIGMORE, op. cit supra note 17, § 2380; 58 AM. JuR. Witnesses
(1948).
29 Ibid.

5§

401-03

30

E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. S 4504(a); OHIO REV. CODE 5 2317.02. To date, thirtyfour states have physician-patient privilege legislation. See O'Neill, Ohio's PhysicianPatient Privilege in Personal Injury Cases - Time for Reform, 16 W. RES. L. REV.
334 n.7 (1965).
3
3E.g., Southwest Metals Co. v. Gomez, 4 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1925); William
Laurie Co. v. McCullough, 174 Ind. 477, 90 N.E. 1014 (1910).
32
See 17 Am. St. Rep. 566 (1899); 58 AM. JUR. Witnesses § 403 (1948); Annot.,
133 A.LR. 732 (1941); 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 17, § 2380.
33 284 N.Y.296, 31 N.E.2d 31 (1940).
34

Munzer v. State, 41 N.Y.S.2d 98 (Ct. Cl. 1943); Munzer v. Blaisdell, 183 Misc.
773, 49 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd, 269 App. Div. 970, 58 N.Y.S.2d 359
(1945) allowed damages against the director of a state mental hospital for releasing
plaintiffs record at that hospital to a member of the board of visitors. The court indicated that the principal functions of a board of visitors were visitation and inspection,
but only as to the general welfare and business administration of the hospital. Maintenance of secrecy was required to prevent the patient from suffering humiliation and
possible damage from disclosures of matters intensely personal to him.
35
Thomas v. Morris, 286 N.Y. 266, 36 N.E.2d 141 (1941). The liberal interpretation and extension of the doctor-patient privilege has been sharply criticized by Wigmore and others as an impediment to the ascertainment of the truth. See 8 WIGMORE,
op. cit. supra note 17; 54 HARV. L. REV. 705-06 (1941); ONeill, supra note 30.
36
Hyman presents two dramatic departures from the way doctors tend to look at
the problem. Doctors often seek prior approval of their proposed studies. They are
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If Hyman gives the lay director the right to examine hospital
records, to what extent is he expected to comprehend what he reads
in the chart? How is he to determine whether the experiments are
essential to the advancement of medical knowledge? Must he
possess special knowledge to determine the risk to the proposed subject? If Hyman means that the director can be held personally
liable for his bad faith in failing to examine hospital records, will
he be held liable simply because his own knowledge is not competent to make a judgment? The New York court offers no answers.
The implications of the present decision extend, unexpectedly, in
another direction. Professional practice in hospitals is usually under
the aegis of a professional board or committee. The lay board concerns itself with matters of broad policy and financial support of
the institution. The intermediate court in the present litigation
clearly felt that the proper function of visiting boards is visitation."
Has the New York Court of Appeals, in rejecting this limited view
of the director's function, opened the door to the review of other
aspects of professional care which might be encompassed within the
corporate director's inspection right?
Since the court based its decision on corporate law, it might have
added that reasonable reliance by a corporate director on expert
opinion has been allowed by some courts. 8 The decision might
have pointed the way out of the enigma posed by human experimentation by suggesting the possibility that the corporate director be informed of proposed experimentation and that he seek the expert
opinion of doctors who have a disinterested view of the proposed
work. Hyman could have been the impetus for the establishment

advised to look to the department heads in medical schools and hospitals, to the specialized societies to which they belong, and to the editors of medical and scientific journals for guidance before proceeding. Many medical schools have committees which
review projected work involving human subjects. See, e.g., Editorial, 2 BRrIsH MEDICAL J. 179 (1954); Welt, Reflections on the Problem of Human Experimentation, 25
CONN. MEDICINE 75, 77 (1961); HARvARD MEDICAL SCHOOL, RULES GOVERNING
PARTICIPATION OF MEDICAL STUDENTS AS EXPERIMENTAL SUBJECTS, Jan. 1, 1958.

None of the declarations and pronouncements of medical bodies about human experimentation speak to the pre-experimental control by any group other than doctors.
Hyman, in contrast to the medical approach to the problem, allows a lay person to
be made a party to the review process. Hyman seems to indicate that that review can
be post facto. The case does not suggest another possible alternative - that the decision to do human experiments receive the prior approval of a lay board of directors.
37 Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 21 App. Div.2d 495, 251 N.Y.S.2d
818 (1964), rev'd, 15 N.Y.2d 317, 206 N.E.2d 338, 259 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1965).
38 HENN, op. cit. supra note 23, at 367.

